

SLUG:TANKERS QUEUE:BOOK1-USN
OR:PC ;06/ OP:PC ;07/26,14:09

1st A.D.

Pfc Michael Riley, 20, sacramento, driver, C co. 4-70 Armor battalion

Spec Shannon Boldman, 22, Peebles, OH, gunner, C co. 1-35 Armor battalion

Sgt. Jeffrey Reamer, 34, Arlington, VA, loader/navigator, HHC 1-35

Sgt. Anthony Widner, 28, Newville, Ala, gunner, C co 1-35

q's: for Reamer:
friendly arty to front, enemy to rear?

Soldiers' account of Medina Ridge, VII Corps biggest battle.
Battle of Medina Ridge

Re: We had an mlrs prep of that area at dawn, and then moved out and took us until 10:00 or 10:30 to get there

B: we stopped at the 00 grid line. the division was on line at 00 line, we stopped there, at chwo, did a little maintenance, they waid be ready to roll out at 13:00, then about 11:30 they said mount up and move out.

Ri: The first contact was charlie company went over on the right flank about 6 a.m.. we were sitting doing maintenance and somebody saw a truck comig over the ridge...we had a truck full of EPWs start advancing on our flank. they surrendered, and they had one of those death squad majors in there, and the whole idea was they were trying to suck us into a kill sack, which they had...so we ended up actioning into a bunch of armored infantry on the left flank, running out there, shooting up about 4 tanks, and they started dropping artillery all over us and we went into reverse because we didn't know where 2nd ACR was and we didn't want to run out in front of them and get shot by our own tanks. so we retreated back over a ridge line and we sat there while they hit them with 155's and some f-16s came up and hit them.

4-70

Medina Ridge: (see diagram for this) 0600 incident: we had moved all night, we were doing maintenance and refuleing, we got the order to move back, then we got in line on column, 56 tanks, and we stayed on line (on the left flank, screening, 56 tanks in a duck row screening to the left, driving ahead, gun tubes to the left)..other units were stopped. we did this because they didn't know where the cover regiment (2nd ACR was over on left).. so the truck came with a major and an aide, one platoon went out, then a truck came and we took the prisoners, and someone saw 4-5 tanks on the horizon. So D co and 1st platoon of C co, actioned into the tanks and assaulted. they engaged and destroyed all the tanks, then they started taking some Sagger, small arms, ATM missiles. So the CO actioned the rest of C co, out here, we stopped about 1,000 meters away from the burning tanks and fired at the infantry, they had a lot of infantry out there. At that time we started receiveing mortar fire. Off on the left flank, we started receiving heavy artillery, just D and C Co of 4-70th. we didn;t know where the 2nd acr was, were afraid we'd end up in front of 2nd ACR and they's shoot us, so they said halt here, but (Iraqi) artillery was dropping, so they said fall back to other side of the

-- MORE --

3rd

Ri: after the war my back and knees hurt for a month. it was like being real old.

W: I cheated and put tennis shoes over my wet weather boots for 3-4 days because my feet were so sore.

Re: But once we started shooting, Fatigue just went right out the window. You were awake. we had stayed up 96 hours, but we were awake.

Re: You know you got no CAS because they were using holes in the sky. we had no CAS for all the rain. we had F-16's and A-10s standing by, and they couldn't come in

We had 4 apaches, but they more or less got in the way because they flew down through the engagement area.

Other one saw some A-10s shooting up something, on the Madina ridge,, ALO told Reamer the A-10s were held back.

6-7 Apaches came behind us, other says he had 8 behind them. Re: they come from our right. we had very little control over the Apaches for some reason. they just went out and went nuts. Our whole division assets of apaches, they let no one know where they were flying. We had no idea where they were coming from or when they were coming, next thing we know we got four in the impact area there, and people are calling in spot reports on them.

B: I picked them up in the TIS and couldn't tell what they were, I kept switching back from TIS to daylight, In daylight it was so hazy you couldn't tell what they were. I heard one person call in thinking they were enemy aircraft. Ri: we almost shot one thinking he was a Hind.

Re: that was a problem. If you've got a unit outside your unit, it's hard to raise them on the radio. and at a critical time, you don't need Apaches going in and stopping your whole movement--or dropping a few of them out of the sky. Although they didn't miss shooting 8 of our M1s. It happened on several occasions, 1-1 Cav, etc. Apparently they were shooting the Hellfire missile. They were just letting it go and it was picking up heat sources, the M1 is the hottest thing out there. They shot 8 during the whole war. Only one was a catastrophic kill because the Halon fire sensors didn't work.

Lost some tanks. towing tanks, hooked up the rear of an M-1 to the front of the M-1, but the heat of an M-1 caught the next one on fire. But turned both tanks up, one of ours and one was B Co. But no serious injuries.

FUEL:

Patton, he's going into a major battle and they ran out of fuel.

Re: Exactly the same thing that happened to us. They came by on our last refuel and gave the tanks 75 gallons and that was it. (B) We got 100 gallons, and I was trying to bribe the guy to get more fuel. (Ri) I was trying to give him MRE's, an AK-47 that I had...Re: the first thing that came to mind was, we're re-living Patton here.

(A day later we got enough, they ran out and had to go all the way back to log base Echo and get it. we overran our supplies we were moving so fast.

LOST:

-- MORE --

SLUG: STRAUSSSQUEUE: BOOK1-USN
OR: PC ; 06/ OP: PC ; 07/26, 14:10

Lt. Col Thomas J. Strauss, 45, Cleveland, 1st AD G-3, ph. 098 1 1 4077, will be at Carlisle on 23 July. _

Lt. Col Keith Alexander, ...1st AD G-2, I'm going to be gone after 10 July to Augsburg taking a battalion command, 204th MI battalion, INSCOM, _

Iraqis never had an intell capability so they could move west. 259 km in length of our sector, width was 18-33 kms.

he had elements of the special forces, one brigade, at the Talil air base, don't know where other 2 brigades were.

roads. they built a series of roads, continuation of the IPSA. pipeline road. we started a mine clearing ops down here. also a road along the border, another parallel with that one.

you got basra, you got the wadi al batin and a road that goes right up it. only a few avenues of approach. the terrain is like barren pool table, but you only need the roads if you can't navigate. 1st and 3rd mech armor were on the roads, elements of 6th and 10th on other road, elements of 17 and 52 on other, along ipsa were RG, along highway 8 were 3 infantry divisions. so all your mobile divisions were on roads. So one of the conclusions we came to two weeks prior to the ground was was that he was road-bound. The way he was defending the roads networks because he believed to get to Basra you'd have to go through this or this or this road network. That gave us a lot more confidence.

The RG wanted to fight. And the infantry, the RG infantry's artillery wanted to fight. most of the artillery came from them, the Adnan. Going from wadi, 27th and 20th were his two best, and the 47th, and the 26th was one of his poorest. from imagery, we saw they were not postured for for the fight

In Khaffi fight, that gave some credence that he couldn't navigate. It appeared that he came out from his own barriers, got disoriented, and didn't have the nav aids to get back and he got hung up in his own minefields. that confirmed our suspicions that he couldn't navigate. unit that came out through Burdan, and when they tried to go back through their lane they were off. then they paused there and that pause caused them to get beat up more.

plus, for a spoiling attack, it's mass, and he didn't mass his units right, he sent them in piecemeal. And when you send in the 5th mech and they get drubbed, it's got to have an effect on the rest of his units.

strauss, went with CG to see Schwarz on Feb 9, and we got an overview from AF. talking to the AF CAS brigadier, he said they had so many A-10s on the scene at Khaffi it was a feeding frenzy, I had airplanes stacked up and had to send some home.

we had 34 training days on average, but it was tense and 24-hours a day and we rehearsed the whole battle. we were still 1 closing forces

-- MORE --

from the day the air war started. we were still training the 23rd of February.

How does AF recognize our vehicles at these high altitudes, higher than Europe? we tried heat signatures, panel markers. we finally ended up putting an orange panel on every vehicle. in fact, we never let the AF make any air strikes closer than 5 kms from our soldiers. also, strobe light that is part of miles device, Multiple Integrated Laser System, a blinking strobe light for the kill. we wrapped tape around it so you couldn't see it from the side. only friendly forces had that. every bradley and every M-1 had that on turret.

The interesting thing was that the 3rd corps in S Kuwait was his best non-Rg corps and the 5th mech was one of his better non-RG divisions. he got bollixed up. he wasn't sending fodder down the road. The saudis and Qatar, it was good for them because from their perspective this guy was no longer 10 feet tall.

Rommel with his entire pnzer army stretched out 40 miles. Us, not even in a column we went 50 to 80 kms in depth. this is formation, how we fought the battle. our mission was always make contact with the smallest force possible. we had in effect 5 tank-heavy battalions plus two mech brigades plus two more attack helos brigades. plus 5 tube arty battns and atacms, very impressive missile. and ineffect had an MLRS battalion.

The irazis fired five battalion missions against hte 1st AD, and we counterfired. they only got to fire each one one time. they were very poor at adjusting fire. no observers, or what? only one arty caught our Cav TOC.

should get J-stars photos that summarize phases of the battle, esp. one on the 26th that shows you where each unit is and where all the bad guys are. shows you first armored, 3rd armored, all on a line the night of the 26th.

we moved about 3 times faster than anyone has moved in the past, including Israelis. you have to go back to Civil War cavalry for the speed and momentum of what we did.

Map. circles are aerial kill zones that we pre-programmed based on where intell said these are his major concentrations of forces or, at least, his defensive installations or fighting positions. they were pre-programmed for artillery and our helos knew it and air strikes knew it. And also road junctions were key. Here's phase line smash, a corps phase line, it's a real road. we drew phase lines every 10 kilometers in the sand. because we had GPS and Loran, at least every platoon leader and bradley had LORAN and had a budzzer that went off when you crossed the phase line. we drew the lines because we wanted to keep the AF in the fight and we wanted to keep the AF 10 km ahead of us. we planned when the AF to plan a mission at Al Bussayeh, weathered out, but ...for first 41 hours of battle, 144 kilometers up

-- MORE --

to here, we had est take 18hours of movement to get here and it took us 14 hours. we moved faster than we thought. we were stopped a couple of times by corps commander, 3rd ACR was slowed down and were trying to keep his fist massed.

two major engagements:

26th and Al bussayah

RG: tawakalna mech, adnan infantry, Medina fight

Concerns: 2nd ACR was moving in front of us and 3rd AD, but had to refuel and slide away from us. decided to let the ACR slide during hours of darkness and the next day we could move faster.

first phase, three major battles...on the 25 and 26 against the 26th division. brigade fight with 3rd brigade in the east, simultaneuouly 3rd AD smaller fight on our flank, our 1st brig fight again with pieces of hte 26th in the east corner, then the morning of the 26th we atack with two brigades abreast, our 2nd brig to west and 1st brig on east to sweep through Al Busayah. intell: we have no division sensors for that, so we depend on theater and national. here's the imagery that we actually got. this is al busayah....this is the border berm, you can see how there's no problem, no trenching, and engineers cut 250 holes thru berm in 8 hours. this pic here shows a couple of NAIs, 11 and 13 on the west side, you can see how their trenchline and defenses are circular...see their trenches and road networks...here's a pic showing a trench an M1 just ran over...trenches were varied, some 4 feet, almost not deep enough to be of use...

from the imagery it looks like an awful lot, but when we went thru and started counting up the 'eaches', how many trucks here, etc, we counted all the trucks and said that don't make the two battalions or brigades they're putting there...so in doing that it gave us a good feeling for what we would fight.

so from that, we made plastic overlays of troop concentration in each area. every obstacle and road and revetment we could find we put on the overlays. we did this in 1:50 and 1:100,000. the bottom line is that for each of the areas our guys would go thru we had it on maps and our brigade commanders would have pictures of it. added a piece of information, list of all the vehicles at an area and their coordinates. we gave them every vehicle location that we had prior to crossing.

was done at the division level. the problem is getting the imagery. something the army needs to do more of at divisn level. the problem is geting the imagery and reading it out. can say there's proably a couple of companies there, if you've got someone saying at division level for the G-3 and the commanders, saying here's how I did it. see, he's got four trucks here, and her's how their lined up...and I thnk for this part of segment we got credit for almost 100 percent perfect intell. now they didn't move that much and these maps wen't all the way down to platoon level. everyplatoon leader had his choice of 1:50,000 or 1:100,000.

to get the imagery, keith had our one analyst and one of the majors down and we got it (gathered?) with the TR-1 (high-flying recon plane) or whatever, it's not important, an aerial platform

-- MORE --

would come back over and take pictures. I mean the plane was coming back anyway. Keith: we did about weekly, we made trips to Riyadh to get imagery. we went the 24th, the 2nd, the 10th, and our last trip was 22 feb, we had two efforts going, we had two folks at Riyadh and I was at another site getting imagery. we were getting it from ARCENT, from the joint imagery production center, which is actually the joint center that provides imagery. the corps urged us to to that and we gave copies of our laydowns to 3rd ACR and 2nd ACR and 3rd AD. I'll tell you that the ARCENT G-2 and 515 MI brigade facilitated it with transpo for us. imagery from aircraft? (he says from U-2).

pics he gives us are from al busayah, but actually a crossroads to south. corps level logistics site. overprinted map was made by keith's terrain team. put that map with event matrix that named areas of interest. the batt cdrs had this and we wargamed it step by step. we had a model we built on the ground ..we produced this about the 21st of feb.

keith: this whole process is called intell prep of battlefield. the army has worked this since 1976. analyzes enemy, terrain, mission, time, brings them all together to produce this decision support template. it puts the G-2, G-3, CG all on the same sheet of music. from the intell perspective it helps me because I understand the operational construct and I can tell them, ok, then this is what you're looking for. I will tell you the hardest thing is given the informaton you've got coming is to acurately assess what you're facing. you will get numerous assessments because there are many different snapshots intime bouncing around. what it finally came down to is the CG saying, OK, we're goin to take the one he says and that's it. some of the worst days of my life were the week before when we got three different assessments of what's going on from ARCENT, DIA, etc. Now each unit focusses on progressively smaller areas, so we are very good at our area, here. So what we we're getting is, 'There's a brigade there.' ARCENT, the lowest level they look at is a battalion. So if they see four vehicles, they don't want to say there's a piece out there, so they say, 'Let's count that as a battalion.' But for us, if you start taking each four pieces and count it as a battalion, you now have a significant division lines up in front of you to plow through. that sig division if you deploy our division on line, costs time. And so the CG in this decision support template wants to know can I swing around to the left, will there be forces here, how long will it take me, do I need to commit two brigades, can one stop and pass one through. he needs to know how long and how much combat power will be tied up in each of these fights.

example: look at these fighting positions, this area around al bussayah, 7th corps logistics bases here, hundreds of thousands of tons of ammo. pics are of part of the complex. he's got to secure this major crossroads since highway 8 is now closed to him. you take a picture on the 24th of Jan from one source and it shows 48 trucks here. you take anohter pass on the 6th of Feb by a different agency and maybe there's only 12 trucks here. but you've still go t the one that says 48. so when you get the analysis from that one guy, he says holy cow.

-- MORE --

tom: cause we had 15 tanks moving around the battlefield. First in al bussayah, then they'd move over here, then move back and forth. they were outpostting the major crossroads. so depending on when you get a picture and what agency gives it to you, unless that agency goes back...at the higher levels maybe they're only looking at battalions and larger, so they suddenly say say, you've got a battalion of T-55's down there. And all you had basically was a reinforced company that was moving back and forth. But if you take the pictures at different times (it looks like more).

keith: and I think the analysts at Corps and ARCENT, are looking at, Corps is looking at this much (big picture) and that analyst spends a few seconds on each. while our guys focus on right down to where the targets on and I would spend hours on that one piece (pic) counting each vehicles. what they would do, if you have imagery, the way it works now is, you ask the analyst what do you see at that point and the analyst looks around that point. So let's say you pick that point and he says two trucks and over here's a tank company, if he's in a hurry to answer 50 requests he's not going to see it. so what you really want is someone like me who knows the intent of the commander. he says I'm coming through that point and I want to know what's all around it....

What we did was line up the imagery and say you want to take your division right up this road here...we said go from here and bring the imagery all the way up and look through everything and point it out and we'll look at it and then we'll hold each of these into frames, then we'll bring the CG and cdrs in and they'll look at it and come up with their assessments.

Corps and division, back when we were in the TAA, our sensors were not where you could intercept. so we were relying on ARCENT and DIA sensors anyway. we would get imagery...corps' major focus for intell collection was the main effort and the main focus was the breach. so 90 percent of your intell sources from Corps were focussed on the breach. that means you've got 10 percent left for a quick wash of the rest of the area. now in our area the breach was not a problem, we showed you that. but now we've got the problem, you want us to be up here in this time...(need to know) can it support two divisions abreast? So we are really reinforcing the corps. So on the 22nd, we went back to ARCENT and they took our assessment (we're getting it declass and you can have a copy) and they believed us and put it out as the assessment. so each division is the expert in its own area.

We also shared intell with others, with 3rd ACR for instance on our flank.

they had our graphics, we had theirs.

Keith: we tracked every mech armor force that could impact us. we had a location like the hawk eye, and we had the latest data they were at that location. this is the Medina locations that we used actually to target the Medina. we did that for each unit, for example the 12th, the 17th, the 52nd, the 10th, the Medina, the Tawalkana, the Hammurabi, all were kept in a series of files with their locations. we did not agree with everybody. for the most part, the disagreements we had were how much was there and what would be the impact on our

-- MORE --

movement. finally, on 22 and 23 of february we probbably had it nailed down as good as ever. coming into Med and HAMM this is what we had, this is one set, that kept running where he was located at those times. as you get furhter back into the RG area the assessments we had correlated about 90 percent with ARCENT and Corps. the reason it was much higher was it got back into the top priority again. we disagreed a little on locations. we had some of them a little more north and west, and they turned out to be a little more north and west than that.

People: Our staff was planning while the div was training. working teh imagery in the TOC i had 2 soldiers, plus I got 4 from Seth to help, total 6; terrain team handed out maps and did overlays; the guys who kept the data bases were about 20 guys all told; and we had an element working special security comms, one that works collection and dissemination, plus special support sectin of computers, etc. ..Our rec is that they put the imagery exploitation capability back in the division. normally a div doesn't do this, it was ad hoc...

Getting imagery: delay?: You can do spot imagery. and can pass that around. one of the things they did very well is they got something called the forcecom automated intell support system that allowed us to receive some of it, to get some of that and pass it around. That gives you a little spot, so if you pick the correct spot, OK. Often you needed something much larger. The wide area coverage is what you needd in your planning, and once you knew where the enemy is, then you can go to your narrow. Wide area stuff is more valuable, but is more difficult to pass, so you have to go to them to get it. WE had the time to do that, in this case; that luxury paid off in getting near perfect intell. The initial projections going to al busayah were 10 percent casualties. WE came up the first time and said we can cut that back, and were beating that around, and finally thought very few casualties. that initial projections was 30 days previous.

when we wargamed it we had one we called the robust threat. (it goes back to, those 15 tanks that were actually there became a tank battalion plus) we had a second on this page you've got. we worst-cased it, and then we took the one based on our intell...if I've got a tank battalion plus that's going to take an entire US ground maneuver brigade to eliminate. We didn't get a vote on that. Because our mission was to sterilize the area of Iraqis, not leave one Iraqi out there in a hole with an RPG to hit a passing US 5,000-gal truck.

NAI's were prepared positions for mech companies. CINC told AF yOUR mission to destroy 100 percent of artillery, 70 percent of his armor. So inthis area we told AF here's what's there: 6 130 guns; MRL; 6 T-55 tanks; and ZPUs. We told the AF CAS general...we took a lot we learned from Rommel and Israelis...Some of the NAIs the force artillery had already programmed into the computers so knew data ahead of time...

The AF had divided all of Iraq and Kuwait into Kill Boxes, their term. Another AF term was 'Moving Bubble.' they said we're going to

-- MORE --

keep a moving bubble (of protection) ahead of you at all times. so when we went into this battle for al bussayah, the AF is working deep, we had 7 strikes programmed (6, however, weathered out). when we got to Al bussayah, and the guys come up with the loudspeakers and say, you'd better surrende, they had already been hit with 346 MLRS rockets and 1,440 155-rounds before literally the first direct fire (tanks) fired. since keith had told us where the targets were the AF was going deep against al bussayah while we were putting MLRS in here and attack helos going in here. actually fighting three battles at once.

WAY we fight: As we advance, from 10-50 km out is AF kill box. attack helicopters, we never brought them close than 3 kms, they worked from 3 to 30 km out in front. this is AH-64 country. arty is as far forward as possible in division, abut 5 km back. so MLRS can reach out to 25 km, and tube arty can reach out to 15-18 km.

now because AF is no lower than 5,000 feet, whenever he turns on his radar he gets hit, so Iraqis are firing SAMs only ballistically. We'd use MLRS to support apaches, so apaches fly only under MLRS umbrella.

We have a fire support officer flying with Apaches who is digitally linked with force artillery. They have an ingress and egress route and the arty guys know their route. It's like a tunnel (ACA, Airspace Coordination AREA, a 3-dimensional tunnel like a heater duct) in the sky and we just avoid the tube, program it into arty ballistic computer. Apaches don't fly over 500 feet, and arty has 500-5,000 feet for indirect fire. Apaches belong to the div cdr. they fly for him, because brigade cdrs are fighting the direct fire battle and div cdr is fighting the deep battle with CAS, AH-64 and MLRS.

We drew the PL's every 10 kilometers. BASEd on range of Apaches, with Hellfire, rockets effective out to 8,000 meters, we could sit outside the 10,000 km box and let the artillery keep shooting and still fire direct fire missions from the apaches. We were getting kills at night from the apaches as far out with Hellfire as 8,500 meters.

Our Apaches had missions on the 25th, the 26th, the 27 abd morning of 28. Only day not fly the 24. Flew a night mission early a.m. the 23rd. ONLY got two A-10 missions the 24 and 25. We had 7 planned for first phase. At 1930 2 A-10s near Al Bussayah and they came back with 4 trucks BDA. Next one was against the Tawakalna at 1430 on 26 Feb with 4 A-10 and 4 F-16 around PL Poland and with BDA of 25 to 30 tanks, 8 in our area and rest in 3rd AD.

After that the weather cleared up and cas...in bad weather, they could fly, but afraid they'd hit us.

With Keith's magic list of targts, we knew Tawalkana was near PL Poland. so we flew an AF mission in there between 1330 and 1400 on the 26th to look for a tank brigade there, they actually found it astride the boundary with 3rd AD and they destroyed 25-30 tanks, eight of which happened to be part of the TAW in our AO. Later on, we shifted him deep and he started pounding Bonn while this fight's going on here, MLRS are hitting the ADNAN here (plus other direct fire fights going on).

-- MORE --

Also, we got to practice on a 3rd stringer here. So we were the NY Giants scrimmaging the JV's from some High School called the (Iraqi) 26th division.

The same way we attacked the 26th, the 3rd Brigade here, maintain the wedge, the 1st Brigade leads, is the same way we go into our fight at night. (which fight??).

Artillery. with info from Keith, he could plot I'm going to maneuver these four battalions of tube artillery to this location to strike this target 22 km away. in order to do what CG wanted to make sure arty was effective before we got into direct fire range, we practiced and practiced the 33 days before.

Why worried about Iraqis? We knew he had good equipment, the t-72 is a good tank. we did not know how good the latest 120 ammo is the A29A1. Turned out great, we're not sure how many T-72s it will go through. they had some excellent artillery, fortunately they don't have our crews. they had arty that outranged any of ours except MLRS. and they had Brazilian MLRS stuff, the Astros. He had fired a tremendous amt of artillery against Iranians, so we thought it would be effective. His arty was our greatest fear. Maybe we'd built this guy up to be 10 feet tall, but we didn't know how good we were either. When you consider the arty, the tanks he had, the quality of trailing, quality of support, and his helos never flew, you take that away and the assessment changes. Had this been a soviet division attacking them it would have been a whole different ball game.

Not know how many deserters? We estimated 200 guys in here, we captured 180 there. Theater-wide your question is more relevant.

Tom: We thought we could start to engage him at 2,500 meters. We didn't know we could engage him at 3,000 meters and watch his rounds fall 1,000 meters short. We didn't know his range, thought it was max 1,800 meters. We didn't know how good the 25 mm, the go-to-war round was. It was eating holes in T-62's and T-55's in the flank. Keith and I landed next to a BMP killed by a Bradley 25 shooting Heat. A Bradley 25 heat's not supposed to be able to kill a BMP. I'd want Bradley's shooting SABots. We thought, just before we deployed, there was a potential problem with our tank ammo at ranges over 2,000 meters that got us concerned. Maybe testers had a bad lot, but we had no problem with the stability of the round.

Keith: I'd feel comfortable attacking an M1 company attacking a T-72 battalion, given the range advantage.

Big difference fighting us in the desert, because it magnified our advantages in range. IN Europe, would have been different, ranges would have been more equal. He would have had a better change if he attack when we were attacking. He would have had a better change is he had moved into contact and tried to fight a mobile defense rather than fixed. But he has a major problem because he can't navigate and we can. He missed his change in August, should have taken port of Dhahran and we would have had to come all the way in from the Red Sea.

We had wargamed it so thoroughly, when we crossed the border we didn't need a map. that planning really pays off. On the 23 of Feb,

-- MORE --

1350 to 1700, we walked a sand table model 100 by 500 meters. each guy dug representative footings. each batt and brigade commander, each tank and fwd support cdr, had to arrive at each phase line and say here's what I'm gonna do. this is what I'm gonna do here, this is how I'm arrayed, I'm gonna use this many tanks for this...the arty commander said I'll move to this phase line and shoot these many rounds to prep this target....right in the desert at division tactical center on the 23rd (we thought we were going to attack on 0700 on 25th) We had the berm made to scale, we had the holes cut in the berm, we walked across the berm through the holes, battalion and separate co. cdrs levels. He'd say, I'm gonna stop here. Col Korn is going to be there and take out those 6 BM-21s there. Korn would say I'm going to shoot 6 rounds of MLRS. Then Col Zanini would say, I'm gonna ...they had these overlay maps. Say, Col Miegs tell us how are you gonna sweep that town. Tell us about that fight. Unfortunately the CG and us got in front of the attacks. we had to tell him once, general, the bad guys are out Keith's door, those are the good guys our your door, we're in front of them. they're good guys. He say, OK, we'd better get back behind them.

That's the difference between a well-trained well-disciplined army and one that is not. And you add in the equipment disparity...Tom: He was prepared to fight the Iranians. He thought, we're at least as good as the North Vietnamese and they held up the US for 10 years... His leaders didn't talk. they didn't do a terrain walk like we did.

Captured the 10th Div's series of counter-attack plans. The 10th at the time was sitting up here and had counter-attack plans. It's astride the N-S Basra-Kuwait City road about in the middle, n. of Kuwait. we captured an overlay with a series of arrows of (projected) US attacks northward. One through Kuwait Bay, one up coastal highway, one through middle, one up the wadi, and one through here??. They never considered anything outside Kuwait and their westernmost arrow was up the wadi and was their last priority. they prioritized their responses, and the wadi was their lowest priority. they never thought we'd attack through the sovereignty of Iraq.

Al Busayah...Commando battalion at Al Busayah, 200 guys, definitely fought, in fact they were in their bunkers and we had to go to direct fire with tank, 155 and gun on engineer vehicles to eliminate them. they didn't surrender. they died in their bunkers...

Gen Franks told us we wouldn't get a rest at Python, but we assumed we'd get a 24-36 hour halt up here. we had moved fuel and ammo fwd about 80 km back, a couple million gallons of fuel on ground, just north of where 1st ID breached. (we found the tanks would get much better fuel than we thought, soldiers would shut them off or not run at attack idle.) But we got up here sooner than expected and 1st ID's breach went faster and they didn't get fuel on the ground. (that is, they never got the fuel into Iraq!! the fuel is still in Saudi Arabia. the bladders are not in position north of the 1st ID breach because the whole corps got up here quicker than thought) we've got

-- MORE --

fuel tankers making a 400 km round trip move and Gen Franks is saying continue to attack east. So we don't top, we sweep through al bussayah. Now the first air strikes locate the Tawalkana (1430, 26 Feb) and as we roll up here and we're at Tangerine with the CAV, then we hit Poland and this fight starts at 1800, but as we roll up here and fire first MLRS against Tawalkana (3rd AD to the south is already in the battle and we can see a tremendous battle just from the flashes down there).

We continue momentum, our main effort is against the Medina near Bonn. 3rd brigade has its fight here (Tawalkana??)

We had to be ready to turn NE if he told his RG to bail out and go up highway 8 and if the 3rd ACR or 24th didn't get there we'd dash up there and hit him on his flank. 101st already had guys astride Hwy 8.

Frag Plan 78 turned us E-SE towards Kiwi. Now we're in 25-30 km wide optimal maneuver space and can use the wedge. At this time we had expected 3rd ACR to be on our flank, but we're 6 hours ahead of him. 24th had had a problem as they moved up north and they got a bunch of vehicles stuck. We made the turn and they didn't catch up until morning of the 27th. So on the morning of the 26th the VII is our here and we're up here and the 3rd ACR is back near Python.

Now Rg moves out: put the TAW on a line here to block the movement of 2nd ACR and 3rd AD, at Poland. Elements of the Adnan come down off the hwy 8, they were located right near that airfield at Rumalah, to block. (we beat the snot out of them and they go back). The Medina comes from its blocking position down to here with the 14th mech brigade and up here with the 2nd brigade. So what you have is putting RG out here so all these weenies can get away. All west of IPSA pipeline. Then elements of another armored div here, the 17th, and the 12th here and they feed into and reinforce the Tawalkana. (where our map shows 52nd, they're really elements of the 12th). 8 theater-level log sites are here outside the Medina, this is the 14th mech brigade.

Now crossing Spain, morning of 27th, we're three brigades abreast. 2nd, strongest, is north; 1st leads in center, 3rd in south. In next 26 hours we fly 54 AF cas sorties (really air interdiction missions) fly 6 separate Apache company strikes and 3 battalion missions, 621 MLRS rockets, 1200 8'', 1800 155 rounds, and during the 26 hours account for 227 tanks, 187 BMPs and MTLBs, 81 arty tubes and 16 ADA systems and 1120 EPW's. We basically destroyed in that last day half of everything we'd done. These were kills during battle.

Fuel crisis... 1st ID was initial effort, supported by arty. but on night of 26th just before midnight we get the 75th field artillery brigade freed from the breach area... (fire first mission for us at 0027 hours on the 27th) but to join up with us they're out of fuel. So the reserve fuelers were counting on for our attack have to fill up the 75th. And now they've got that 400 km round trip to Saudi Arabia. Morning of 27th from 0700 to 2000 at night we're in a fuel crisis and only move 30 kms. We had a hell of a fight, and fuel was a

-- MORE --

big constraint. 2nd brigade and 3rd brigade are slowed down in their momentum. we got fuel from 3rd AD, our G-4 was flying around looking for fuel.

Battles:

(1) battalion-size of TAW plus reinforcement of mech, 31 t-72, 5 mtlb, 7 bmps. The only place we lost any M--1s, 4 hit in rear, some multiple times, by t-72's 125 mm close at 1,000 meters. It was a night battle and they swept past the positions and got shot in the grill doors. only one lost. only one injured soldier.

(2) ADnan, D-30 towed 122 mm how and GHN-145 battalions, we get permission to fire out of sector, shot them with Apaches and MLRS, they leave. adnan fires about 1,000 rounds on our 2nd brigade, they go a little out of sector and encounter them and come back.

(3) Medina comes in and sets up here, 2nd brig of Medina and two other brigades are trying to fill the gap. Medina is on line, and our 2nd brigade, 3 battalions vs their 3 battalions. Medina, 130 vehicles, all wiped out in 15 minutes of shooting, 40 minutes of fighting.

(4) these guys here in south, the 14th mech brigade and brigades of 12th or 17th never get set. they come out here and go through 8 theater log sites and things are blowing up and they get piecemealed don't use their coms and they get defeated in detail. this takes several hours to do because it's a grinding process (one US soldier killed by direct fire) because of all the bunkers in complex.

Bottom line is, 4 Iraqi brigades plus arty destroyed between midnight the 26th and 0800 the 28th. see total

Dead are: Corps level log sites, brigade of 26th, two of Medina, the 14 and 2nd, brigade minus of the TAW, two of 12th and one brig of the 17th and pieces of 10 other fleeing divisions. Captured prisoners from 17 diff divisions. Most of those prisoners were taken on the hwy 8 complex.

See their figures on total vehicles, etc destroyed.

If you have photo requirements in excess of what we have here, let me know. I have some pictures here of al busayah.

His problem is, he doesn't know how to dig a revetment. No overhead cover. he didn't have the observation fields of fire that he needed. His fighting positions are too close together. when you're engaging someone over 2,000 meters, if he's got a fighting position less than 500 meters apart, it's a very simple thing to fire one round and make a slight adjustment on the next tank. It's also easier to engage on high magnification when they're that close together. If you're less than 50 meters, you can get them both hi-power and you don't have to be switching back and forth searching. Also, what he did, we used a stepped fighting position, learned that at NTC. When your tank is in the bottom you can't be shot except from top. To acquire targets, you move up here and can expose and slew your turret.

I'd say about 10 percent of his positions like this, hull down and turret exposed. That's the 50 percent solution. Most of his were MILES berms, just dirt piled up around him. That doesn't even slow down a SABOT round. He's had a number of Soviet advisers and they

--- MORE ---

don't know either. Here's a pic of Medina and you can see his line, that's awful close together on a modern battlefield. They may be 100 meters apart. That's OK in Germany, but not out here in the desert. 6 seconds between shots, you can take 4 in 24 seconds.

-- END --

Lt. Gen. Frank Franks, CG of VII Corps...

Here we were a fully modern Corps trained and ready in Central Europe, so in a sense we were sitting there like the Third Army in the Bulge in WW II. Small group of us in VII Corps had done some things in August, early Sept, convened a small group of intell, planners, put some maps up and started to track the situation to put our heads in the game. If they needed us, individuals, units whole Corps, we'd go...

before Nov 8 small little planning cell had been working this for some time prior to the 8. the soldiers didn't know, but we had a ?? we were working on a contingency, but got the order on the 8th.

Took leadership of corps to Saudi to look at the terrain, get some mission planning guidance, got that from Schwarzkopf on the 13th. got some lessons learned from soldiers already there. And US Army Europe, and European Command (EUCOM) took over deployment of the corps so we could concentrate on what to do when we got there.

On 13th, we met with Schwarz. He essentially laid out then a 4-phased operation, three air and one ground, with the general concept of the operation that if it would come to need for offensive ops that's what we would do. From that point on I knew the approx area we'd be operating in and what our mission would be, and he didn't deviate much from that at all through entire planning and conduct of ops.

The internal tactics of the corps was left up to the corps, but the idea that we were to operate in this general area and our mission was to attack and destroy the RG forces in this sector, that was laid out right at the beginning.

VII Corps had the area from the Wadi to the west, and 18th corps would be to our west and others coalition and marines to east. 7-18th corps boundary not set yet, but the idea was a wide envelopment combined with interdiction of hwy 8 LOC from Baghdad to their forces in the field. When Gen Schwarz. talked to us on 13th it was clear to us that's what he wanted to do.

So at that time I knew that we'd op west of the wadi, and the theater deception scheme was to lead the Iraqis to believe what they wanted to believe, the way they had set their defenses at that point and were reinforcing it was for an attack up the wadi and a shallow attack into Kuwait City and an amphib assault. those were planning parameters...I knew corps would consist of units from Germany plus 1st ID from Ft Riley which had been with VII corps before in Reformer. Brits came later in December when they added another brigade and a full-up division. we started talking about it in early dec, came under our tactical control in january. superb troops, well-led, aggressive. that was our fourth division. Then the possibility was that 1st CAV, which was to be the theater ground reserve, depending on how battle went, that we could get op. control of them too.

How long think last? In my own mind, I thought 8 days. I thought it
-- MORE --

could be over as quickly as 8 days based on enemy situation and how rapidly we'd move and where we'd finish up. My own est. was it'd take us 2 days to get to the the RG and the better part of 3 or 4 days fight out here and 2 days to consolidate. Actually, took us only a day to get contact in a brigade of the 12th Armored division and then the Tawalkana. And we attacked earlier, on G-day rather than G plus 1.

We knew enemy disposition..also, in history of desert warfare what has been decisive is air, logistics and maneuver. To me, this resembled a sea, as though you put your fleet to sea. No real restraints as to where you can take your fleet. So it's a matter of navigation and mass. Turns out the Iraqis took their fleet out here too, but they anchored it. They restricted themselves because of their choice of tactics and because of the presence of our air to maneuvering only the length of their anchor chain.

Great team, veterans at corps, chief of staff and corps staff and my G-3 and I had worked together twice before. Early decision where put corps on the ground, and not have to move it a lot. We wanted to put it where it would reinforce Iraqis idea that we were attacking up the wadi, but also be far enough west so we could only move one time and be ready to go. original position was a little further east, so met with with Yeosock and Centcom and agreed we could put it further west, but not west of wadi. Agreed to put the corps north to south, just east of the wadi, with the 1st ID north of tapline rd, 1st AD just to south and 3rd AD to south of that. And then we added a place for the 1st UK. so essentially we were laid out north to south. That would lead the enemy to think we would attack due north (up the wadi) but also put us in a position to move from e to w. (I kept 2nd CAV over to the east because we had to stay tied in with the 18th corps, and we had a log base alpha over here to consume supplies in here, then at the last minute we put another log base west to provision the attack.) So 2nd Cav linked 18th Corps with the rest of VII corps, and the egyptian corps in the area and also to rprovide some deception. so they were very active there in their training and we also put an electronic emissions unit there if someone was watching us they'd believe that VII corps was over here (southeast of wadi, south of Kuwait border) knowing that we normally led with a cavalry regiment.

(Also making changes, changed 105 tanks for 120 gun tanks in two batts of 1st AD, drew mine countermine eqpt, GPS eqpt, changed 5,000 tankers for MEMMT fuelers, changed all bradleys in 2nd ACR from M-3 to M2A2 with better overhead ballistic protection. Also practicing large unit maneuvers. Each of these divisions had more than 8,000 vehicles, a little more than a WW II corps. Soldiers in VII corps in german was 42,000 and we expanded to 146,000.)

Lot of team building with commanders. I believe that 80 percent of command and control is non-electronic. Not much time? We got our last eqpt from Europe on 17 Jan, some of reserve eqpts came in on 17 Feb, elements of 142nd artillery brigade from the Armansas National Guard

-- MORE --

and they were in combat on the 24th. reinforcing the fires of the 1st UK.

Needed to protect tapline, from a spoiling attack down to Hafir al Batin, and when they did the Khafji attack it looked like they might try that. 1st CAV had lost a brigade, had its Tiger Brigade moved over here to the Marines...assigned 1st Cav, given op control of a 1st CAV Brigade of the 101st for about 2 weeks, 2nd ACR and our aviation unit..used them and left the rest alone to practice. So to do that we moved the 1st CAV from down near KKMC up north of the tapline rd and then when the egyptian corps moved east with the syrian division and then moved the 1st cav up next to the border in the middle of January.

In early january we had looked at Iraqi defense. we were trying to build a plan like calling an audible so when the Iraqi defense was set we could make one more move. you never want to run out of options. It appeared he would have his front line infantry units backed up by an armored div. but how far to west? when it appeared in early january he would not move further west than the 26th divisin, and after air campaign started he couldn't move because of air attack on moving forces, we called the audible. We put two divisions and a cav regiment out here (1st and 3rd and 2nd ACR) out here to envelop these front-line defenses. I had given the mission to 1st ID to conduct a breach, inititially thought we'd have to pass all divis through the breach because we though the Iraqis would be uniformly strong all the way out. penetrate on a narrow front and pass the whole corps through. the audible was to put 2 divs out here. initially thought we'd have to use 3rd AD here (near wadi) to reinforce the deception with raids and feints...to rivet Iraqi reserves and RG on an attack up the wadi so they would not reposition themselves westward. wanted them to position for a shallow raid into Kuwait city. But getting the 1st CAV enabled us to move them up here to to that raids and feints that we later called the battle of the Rugi pocket, named after SAudi town of Rugi there. and freed up 3rd AD, which needed the time because they were late getting in. but the only question was can we fit them in side by side, or stack them behind each other. I thoght we needed three divs and a cav regiment to attack the RG, to the question was how to get the three out here. So the key was Centcom releasing to ARcent to release to VII corps the 1st CAV to protect the ARCENT LOC, allowing us to have 1st CAV for feints, freed 3rd AD. But this was only 40 kms wide for two divisions. Cav went on a recon out here and looked around, and said not a problem it's all trafficable, and you can put them side by side. convened a meeting with ron griffith and butch funk and cav regimental commanders down at 1st AD, 1st Armored, because it had to move quickly up here, they had 25 kms and the 3rd had 15 kms. 3rd would be in a column of brigades, reorganize later, which stretches out 100 kms, and 1st would go in a division wedge. Also 1st needed to be in formation faster becaus some resistance out here at objective Purple, which turned out to be the rear supply area of Iraqi 7th corps. Al Bussayah.

-- MORE --

Looked like 3 fights. Front line infantry. the tactical reserve, armored. we thought it was the 12th, turned out to be the 52nd, nomenclature. And the RG. we thought the RG had 3 options: stay and fight, attempt to maneuver 2 divs plus, a shallow maneuver to the south or further out west. (that was OK, we could fight maneuver). or attempt to save their forces and retreat to Basra across the causeway or on up hwy 8 towards Baghdad, and in that case the 18th Corps would stop them there and we'd hit them in the flank and have them up against the river. (If they decided to stay and fight the 18th would be in a position to continue down highway 8 and we'd turn into them and have them pinned up against the Basra pocket. And if they decided to maneuver out west then we felt with the 18th Corps on our flank and us coming up we'd have a positional advantage with the 1st AD quickly to maneuver, set a base of fire with one division and maneuver with 2 divisions.

Turned out they did a little of all 3. They had the Jihad corps, 12th and 10th divisions that they made up in late November perhaps in response to the additional coalition forces coming in. So they had the RG and the Jihad corps, two maneuver formations. they attempted to do some local repositioning. they attempted to escape, esp the Hamarrabi either up hwy 8 or across the euphrates at the causeway, and some attempted to get out thru Basra. so we had 3 fights. (defensive line, reserve, and RG, and how to envelop and crack the defensive without fighting the whole force since the objective was RG. and the question was how to get 3 divs and a cav reg massed against the RG before they could either maneuver against us, get into position, or attempt to leave. so we needed a simultaneous breach, and as soon as completed needed to get the 1st UK through to defeat the armor division (in reserve) and with this shallow envelopment crack these defenses and we'd be behind them and cut off and they'd surrendered or stay where they were. and we'd not have to fight them or go through the teeth of the obstacles. So the combination of the feints of 1st Cav, the rapid breach by 1st ID followed rapidly by 1st UK. Then it was a matter of synchronizing finishing this fight (probably 1st ID vs 42nd) and gaining an additional division to fight this fight (RG?). I needed brits to defeat the 52nd armored so the enveloping force wouldn't be vulnerable to a flank attack by the 52nd armored. And I needed the 2nd acv to get out here and move east and frustrate any attempt by reserve or the RG to move westward. They would have pinned them in place, not necessarily win but slow them up.

Arty raids. in about two weeks, we fired 9,000 cannon and 1600 MLRS rockets in arty raids here. with maneuver and feints by 1st cav. their most important mission was to fix the reserve and RG so they wouldn't see us out west, great action by John Taleli and the 1st Cav. plus destroyed some I arty and his command and control.

How stop forward Iraqis from communicating? with air campaign, we wanted to isolate these forces so when we attacked comm, if any, would be fragmentary. worked with air campaign and worked very hard

-- MORE --

on a brigade near the breach. that cdr asked why the A-10s kept picking on me and not my neighbors. but his brigade (probably in 48th div) was in a very key spot, so the 1st UK would get a running start out of the breach and the I's would not cause a jam-up in the breach. We knew this was the Iraqi 7th corps out here, we knew he had control of these divisions, and maybe would get control of 10 and 12 Jihad. we wanted to work on the C&C so as we maneuvered rapidly he wouldn't be able to let them know what was happening. with help of air forces, did that.

Two reasons to move corps at last minute. To get momentum for troops moving, and to make the deception work. We were to be in position here at 21st. We thought it would take about 6 days to get in position.

Roads?? In january had gone to John Davidson at corps and asked him to lay out road network. 1st UK HAD been analyxing the roads and where water sources, and pattern emerged that the Iraqis were oriented their movements along roads that were there or they had built. you begin to move his tactical tendencies. we learned after the battle that they were very surprised we had come out here. one of their officers said, "We always get lost in the middle of the desert." And up here is their training area. they tried to stay on roads and trails, and after the air campaign started that was sure destruction.

G-day. Light data had a big effect. yo look at what we were going to do here, we needed to pass the 1st UK thru in 24 lanes through the minefields and barriers during the hours of darkness and hit the Iraqi first line. so the ability to move logistics at night, fly aviation at night, we felt we'd be better with the light we had in the 21 to 24 timeframe than earlier when totally dark. experts predicted attack in pitch dark, we knew that. with all the stories about attacking in total dark, we'd pick some other time.

so it remained to move the corps...and we were laid out to move from E to W the same way we'd move from south to north. so we could rehearse the whole thing. same formation, full-up corps rehearsal, 160 kms. put the 2nd acr out in front and did it. we had a sandstorm. we learned about communications, where cdrs would want to be, speed of large formations, navigating large formations, timed separations...before crossing the LD there was so much work. learning on the move about how much water and fuel, refueling on the move. we could consume potentially 2 1/2 million gallons of fuel a day. how to organize large numbers of fuel tankers and keep up. how to concentrate arty fires, we did a lot with attack helos to include a cross border raid by the 2nd of the 6th Cav on the 13 of Feb as part of these raids..all arty had fired practice..av brigades had practiced cross-border raids, gave units some combat experience. learned from 1st Cav how the Iraqis were not good at shifting artillery, if you moved fast. We saw in their platoon, company-size units up where they would see the Cav units maneuvering and would exchange fire but the arty fire was always in certain spots. if the

-- MORE --

Cav continued to move, they couldn't adjust. and as soon as they'd shoot, they'd use counter-arty radar and use MLRS to knock arty out. Also, they didn't seem to want to move their units around. turned out to be true. we also learned about treating our own casualties. important thing was to get fluids into people quickly...our evac was sound.

We wanted to keep the armored divisions tucked up within about 30 minutes of the Cav so they could exploit the opps or if run into something sizeable could back them up. we had constructed a complete replica of the Iraqi barrier system, antitank ditch, berms, minefields, wire...and the brigades of 1st ID conducted full-up rehearsal of the breach and the 1st UK practiced going thru the planes. when you see took 90 hours, but let's not equate swiftness with ease. so much work and preparation. the first element of taking care of soldiers is insure they're prepared for combat. we locked the plan down in January, and left it alone to do other things, to rehearse the plan. They worked at sand table exercises, rubber-duck exercises, one officer represents one unit and you lay the whole unit out and just walk around first, then you get vehicles and do it that way, then you put the whole unit out. experimenting with how to set a base of fire, how to maneuver with brigades.

Mock-ups. What they told us was they took us about two weeks to build this and so if it took us two weeks, no way they could extend this (defense) out here.

1st ID then did recon with aircraft and artillery not to give away position. 1st UK moved from e to w, did a full-up rehearsal of all the moves they were going to make from west to east.

Confidence? The one unknown out here was chemical. we thought we might get some while 1st cav was doing raids and demos. Also, it looked as though the enemy had gone for the feint. I remember writing myself some notes, saying, "OK, we got them where we want them now. If they'll just stay where they are for a few more days we'll have them where we want em to be." Air campaign kept them in place, could only move small units.

Confidence level grew, because of our own co-op, training, troops were ready. I visited a soldier out here in the 3rd AD, talkign to soldiers about the plan, explainig we had a big formation out there whehe I's didn't have anything, and it was already too lengthy an explantation and the soldier cut in and looked me right in the eye and said, "Don't worry, General, we trust you." Felt good.

G-day: we were to attack on G plus one. ON G day we moved the 2nd ACR across the berm, cut the berm for the two divs to follow and moved early in the moring 20-30 kms out in front of the border. The first ID had sent an apache raid out, 1st cav contined raids. About 9:30 am I got a call from Jon Yeosock and CINC wanted to know if we could attack early. I said yes. called my cdrs and told John, as

-- MORE --

18th airborne corps had, that on two hours notice we could go. 1st ID took lot of adjustment because were to do a 2 1/2 hour arty prep and did only 30 minutes prep. and 1st UK, instead of passing thru at the end of day in the dark would have to move up and pass thru early. So at 1300 we got order to attack at 1500.

ON east was Egyptians, ...we did discuss that, you always want to say what if the enemy goes for the deception, will that have some adverse consequences? he might keep his forces away, the other poss was he'd bring his 6th armored div down closer to the border and we talked to Gen. Sala?? the Egypt cdr about that and he was not overly concerned. and as it turned out they attacked with 3rd div and were to follow thru with 4th, but 3rd div accomlshed their objective and they just shot the 4th div through to the airfield over here (where?). they went thru 20 km east of the wadi. the Iraqis seemed to go for the airtillery and air concentrations as a feint, and 1st cav feints (out to distance of 25-30 kms from wadi). the Iraqi 27th and 25th divs were stacked pretty close to wadi, and the 31st and the 48th...and the 26th had two brigades (check where) here and one further back in depth. then the Iraqi 7th corps were these 5 divisions near border and two in 18th corps sector plus this one here?? and this supply base (al bussayeh), so he had a pretty big area.

While the divs advance on a broad front, and filled sectors, the instructions were to get 3 divs and cav massed against the RG. the idea [was not] to sweep the sector of all Iraqis, my instructions to enveloping force was to [bypass] infantry and to destroy arty and mech forces, so we did by-pass some infantry. later captured. 1st AD had orders to attack and seize this objective al bussayeh log base.

the diecison point was going to be whether to continue to attack on a northeast path, or turn east, depending on what RG did. if the RG had chosen to go up and run into 18th corps on hwy 8, near An Nasariyah, then VII corps would attack in an army maneuver, from the south into their flank on hwy 8. if they stayed in place, rather than have 18th corps stay out there they would pivot and go to east. When decide?

Late Monday afternoon (day 2, Feb. 25, as the corps approached PL Smash) it was apparent they were going to stay there and I had given instructions to 1st ID to leave a battalion task force here (??) and be prepared to pass through the 2nd Cav Reg. and then for the 1st and 3rd ADs to pivot 90 degrees to the east and head into the flank and the rear of the RG.

The best thing you can do in major unit operations is to give a heads up for waht plan to do in next 24 hours. In reforger in 1990 we came up with a technique of publishing Frag plans, so our planners developed a series of Frag plans. what if, what if...what if they stayed here, we exercised was Frag Plan 7, we'g get here and the left hook smack woud come from outside and we'd attack due east into the flank and rear of the RG. If they still had forces here (just outside Kuwait) we'd attempt to cut the forces from the forces in Kuwait and deal with them and the 18th corps would simultaneously come around from the top and simultaneously deal with these. the closer we got to

-- MORE --

the fight 7 looked to be the highest probablily. On Monday...a series of key things happened...the 1st ID finished a breach and at noon the first UK came through and came into contact with the 52nd and were having good success. And hitting the rear of the defensive units, capturing general officers and prisoners coming to the rear. It looked like we didn't need more than a battalion TF for breach security, so 1st ID left a battalion and as soon as the 1st UK pass, move forward. Simultaneously the 2nd Cav about noon intercepted a brigade (50th brigade) of the 12th armored div that was trying to repositon out here on a road built by the Iraqis (PL Blacktop) to the IPSA pipeline rd. The 2nd Cav stopped that move with good CAS that day, and continued through that. That was the first indication of maneuver out here. But deep the three RG were pretty much where they were. So late monday pm I called back to my main CP and asked my chief of staff, G-2, fire support coorinator, and av brigade cdr to meet me out here. it looked as though we needed to make a decision whether to go east or nor-east.

Used Frag plan 7 graphics, but it had the 1st Cav in southern piece of it and 1st ID was a corps reserve. IN addition, FRAG Plan 7 called for the attack to separate the units in Kuwait from those in Iraq, but since they were retreating to the North trying to get up here we decided to press the attack with 3 divisions attacking W to E into the flank and rear of the RG (they were facing south) and the remainder of 10 and 12 divs. UK contined to east. The Army boundary would have pinched them out, they would have run out of room. we were trying to get the Army boundary changed to allow them to continue to the east. it went up and over but it would have pinched them up and aout and we wantd them to go straight across to Kuwait City. Late Monday new graphics, and set stage for massing against RG on Tues, day 3, Feb 26. Ordered 1st ID to pass thru 2nd Cav to continue as southern of 3 US divisions and have UK continue so we actually have 4 divisions heading east. Needed to have 2nd ACR press to east to find and fix the RG and find the southern flank of the TAW, and to get the 1st AD around the outside on Al bussayah, and ordered the 3rd AD to pass around the 2nd Cav and narrowed 2nd Cav's sector and told to press to east.

At 9:30, Tues, Feb 26, day 3, that Am we got the 1st Cav, and thinking the point of main effort would be, told them Tues moring to come up on the outside to reinforce 1st AD. Meanwhile two arty brigads, 42 and 75th, had to leave from suppoprt of the breach and join 1st and 3rd AD for rush north. 2nd ACR in sharp engagements late ~~monday and~~ tuesday with security elements of a brigade of the Tawakana in what they call the Battle of 73 easting. (see H.R. McMaster's report) Then Tuesday 3rd AD piched up attack, and 1st Armored finished its battle and around noon I had 2 armored divs on line with a Cav regiment. 3rd AD was two brigades up and one back. They hit the Tawakana brigade here, brigade plus in center, and 1st AD had a piece of TAW up here in north. Late Tuesday after dark I had orederd the 11th Av Brigade to conduct a deep attack to isolate these forces (RG) with Av deep, the armored div's attacking in a zone of 20-

-- MORE --

Tues 26
mex

30 km's deep, the aviation deep, and the interdiction by the AF deeper yet. so we pretty much had a battle in depth late Tues until the cease fire. So we ended up with 4 divs on line and a night attack to the east. 1st and 2nd AD continued attack all night Tuesday. (indications that they thought they were being hit by air, drill was to get out of vehicles in into bunkers) We did have in 1st AD sector we had some 360-degree fights where mounted elements would roll thru and Iraqis out of their bunkers firing RPG's and small arms and some intense fights going on in 1st and 3rd sectors. I saw an RPG hole in a right fender fired at such a close range it didn't even arm.

Some very sharp fights, ²⁷ the Iraqis were attempting to reposition after they found we were coming wide. All Tues night a full-up night attack by 4 divs. On wed mornign having 1st cav move up north, brits moving toward the coast, hwy 8, it appeared 1st would be in obj Denver astride HWY 8 by nightfall and it looked like a double envelopment was possible (around Medina and Hamurabi). 1st AD had fought the Medina. late that morning I had convened an orders group to lay out for 1st Cav to attack on north of 1st AD late Wed, early Thurs, and for 1st ID to continue the attack here (on south) to attempt a double envelopment to isolate Medina and Ham and others. Late Wed 1st AD had sharp contacts with Medina, 1st ID was successful and pushed a cav squadron further north of Denver, but couldn't get the 1st Cav passed around to north of 1st AD late on Wed because of the action by 1st AD here, decided to do that early the next day. It turned out that resistance was crumbling, then about 2200 got the first indication of a cease fire next day. Then Yeosock said at 2330 poss of ceasefire at 0500. then 0230 got call that ceasefire would be at 0800, so we attacked until 0800 but there was not much resistance out here; and it turns out the double envelopment wasn't necessary and we ended the fight astride hwy 8 (n-s road) and the 1st AD close to their objective Bonn and had completed destruction of RG in our sector. that was the end of the fighting for us.

Then, in mid-march we got considerable refugees in our sector.

Sectors: The 1st key call was on the first day. the 3rd AD was designated as the corps reserve and the question was whether to follow them in tight against the 1st AD or to maybe attack them this way (to east, to go against the Tawakalna) and leave this (middle) open and fit the third division (probably 2nd ACR) in the middle as opposed to down here to the south. depending on what the Iraqis were gonna do. But since it appeared the RG would stay there, it appeared the better angle was from the north and so butch funk and I and don holder sketched it out on butcher paper and asaid, OK stay in your original sector. then the second key call was to have the 1st ID leave a task force at breach and bring the div up here, that was a new sector for them, and the width of the sector needed by the 1st UK as they attacked east contained the 1st ID and they had to move forward in a column of brigades. They took the frag plan 7, everybody had the graphics, but the units that fit in were different, instead of the 1st Cav going into that sector it was the 1st ID. The sectors that

-- MORE --

turned to the EAST for 1st and 3rd and already been designated, and we had some phase lines out here to control attack from the east and the south to north by the first ID so we wouldn't run these units into others.

Normally, you usually draw phase lines along a stream or road or something but in desert its diff. so we tried to put them on an azimuth for GPS. actual control measures were tough.

How early on did we know outrange Iraqis and kill at 3,000 meters. I think we knew it from a potential standpoint, and we saw how accurate their servie ammo was. But I don't think until the 2nd ACR actually hit this brigade repositoning on Mon afternoon did we understand the true rapid lethality of the direct fire, tow and tank. We knew we had the potential but until we did it...we wanted to engage him outside of his ability to see us, and so, actually the weather, 50 percent of th weather was no-fly, but the sandstorms and the rain actually hwlped us in the attack. One Iraqi said, "Nobody attacks in a sandstorm." We had trained in German, the UK, so rain, cold weather and wind; our soldiers knew how to fight through that.

J-stars: In theater, we had a ground station module at the Corps main CP and it was a very key factor in determining what the final set was and were these units attempting to move around and where were they going? and you could put that together with what the 2nd Cav got out there and they were seeing it on the ground. We had real time data.

Not for aiming artillery. When we launched the deep attack by the 11th Av Brigade we knew there was movement back here, attempts to reposition and maneuver out of the area. And deeper target for them and for F-111s was pretty much keyed by what J-stars was seeing. Confidence level, good.

The ability to attack the enemy throughout the depth of his formations ground and air is our airland doctrine.

We ended up firing 55,000 cannon rounds and 10,500 MLRS rockets during the war.

Fights. 2nd ARmored Divison Fwd had some here, 3rd Ad 3rd brigade; 2nd Brigade of 2nd AD; Monty Miegs, his great-grandfather was the quartermaster-general of the union army.

Iraqi plan:

The Iraqis plan was for the Jihad Corps eitehr to maneuver down the wadi against our attack there or northwest, attempt to get out here. the 2nd Cav stopped taht. what they were trying to do it appeared was get out front of us here and the RG would be behind them then we'd have to fight our way through that corps to get at the RG and we didn't want that to happen. but if we'd been a little slower or the 2nd ACR had not stopped them...so they had a plan. these forces were to fight and give early warning of the direction and speed of the attack and then the Jihad was going to maneuver and the RG to come down to defeat an attack (by hitting us on the flank as we were) coming shallow into kuwait city (from the west).

They had a plan, and were attempting to execute it, and they were

-- MORE --

trying to fight us. but our speed, and tactical savvy of our soldiers from training programs through sandstorms and rain day and night let us execute our plan. with air supremacy and availability of air and speed of our attack.

Pioneer: We used the UAV initially to target artillery out here. we wanted to destroy any artillery in range of the breach and we did that and UAV was a big help.

Attack helos:

1. used them for armed recon day and night.
2. in depth, FLOT, division apaches 20-30 ahead with own apaches
3. and deeper still was Corps attack assets 50-60 kms.

Don Holder used the analogy of carrier warfare, if you get your avastation out there they never see your fleet.

Was to be much more a freedom of action out here in the zone of action based on what the enemy is doing and their own capabilities. I wanted to give the division commanders max freedom to employ their forces within their sectors. Less prescriptive, to describe intent, what do you want done and forces to be applied and then allow initiative at the smaller unit or major unit level. you draw the sidelines for the commander and let them do their own broken field running. particularly imp in desert. "We were force oriented, I didn't give a damn about the terrain other than being able to maneuver thru it." the direction, speed for the attack, position advantage and then give the commanders max freedom within their sector. but not totally free agents wanted to mass a big fist out here, force oriented, and let them use their own tactics. Gen Griffith (1st AD) used a div wedge. Bueth funk kept two up and one back and at one point passed one brigade through another one to maintain momentum. Tom Raymond south used two brig up and one back and pushed his Cavalry way up because they had tanks in the Cav Squadron. Gen Rupert Smith usually maneuvered two side by side or push one out and keep one back. I selected the Corps tactics, let the Div. cdrs select the tactics within their sectors.

Aftermath:

took care of 30,000 refugees over 9 weeks, Iraqi civilians, temp refugee camp in Safwan. then protection for refugees out near Rafha. When Saudi govt agreed to take refugees we moved about 8,400 refugees from Safwan to Rafha in C-130's to temp site we had built while Saudis building a permanent site.


temp site to hold 30,000 refugees from An Nassariyeh, Al Salman, hardtop road coming down and we sent forces out there...permanent site hold about 30,000 too.

-- END --

Ag

SECRET

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE



SECRET

Ag

Tank going through Berm

VII Corps in action

The Jayhawk Corps' desert experience began Nov. 8 when President George Bush announced that he was sending European and stateside-based troops to Saudi Arabia to give coalition forces an offensive capability. VII Corps in Desert Shield would be made up of active and Reserve component soldiers and units based in Europe and the United States. Before corps units could deploy to the

Middle East they needed to perform several tasks. They had to load hundreds of trains, ships and airplanes with thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks and other weapons of war. They needed to adapt proven warfighting skills to the desert and the new mission. And they needed to adjust to the thought of going into combat.

Developing plans

A quick leaders recon to Saudi Arabia on Nov. 10 set VII Corps' planning in motion. While leaders developed plans for the deployment and for caring for families left behind, soldiers dug in with enthusiasm. Faced with a certain threat and a cause worth fighting for, soldiers

steeled themselves for the uncertain months ahead.

Within four days the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which had patrolled West Germany's border with the east for more than 45 years, began loading for the quick voyage from Germany to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the corps' support soldiers began assembling the ammo, transport and life-support systems needed to carry the war to the enemy.

The deployment continues

The deployment continued at a fast pace. The first soldiers flew to Saudi ports, linked up with their equipment, and moved to the desert. The 2nd ACR took up screening positions in the northern part of what later became the VII Corps' initial sector, establishing security for the many soldiers yet to come. Signal soldiers set up communications systems ranging from ultra-modern satellite and mobile-telephone systems to time-tested land lines.

Engineers brought their heavy equipment to the desert to carve out defensive positions, roads and airstrips from the barren land. Mechanics, truck drivers and cooks set the stage for the bulk of the combat troops.

Forming the corps

While waiting for their turn to deploy, the heavy divisions that gave the corps its striking power continued training while getting their equipment and themselves ready for war. Tankers and Bradley crews fired crew-level gunnery at Grafenwoehr and used simulators at their home bases. They trained with chemical equipment, rifles and other weapons. They learned about the hazards and customs of a new land. Doctors poked them and prodded them, lawyers wrote their wills and leaders drove them around the clock.

Many soldiers faced the additional challenge of learning to work with new faces. Force reductions in Europe and others factors combined to lead planners to assemble complete divisions from battalions and brigades from throughout the United States and Germany.

Corps-level combat support and service support units also carried a mix of active and Reserve component units under a single headquarters. For example, MPs from three active brigade and two Reserve component battalions deployed under the corps' own 14th MP Brigade headquarters. The 2nd Corps Support Command swelled from its peacetime strength of nearly 8,000 to more than 25,000.

TOW missile

Troop arrivals jumped from a trickle to a flood as December ticked away. More than 1,000 troops from VII Corps' inactivating 1st Infantry Division (Forward) deployed as a port support activity receiving soldiers and equipment off planes and ships. They sweated through providing shelter for a population that soon reached 30,000 and moved units out to the desert to make way for later arrivals.

Life in the port

Deploying VII Corps soldiers flew into airports near the ports of Al Jubayl and Dammam. They stayed in warehouses and tent cities while waiting for their ships to come in. On arrival, they painted combat vehicles a light tan to match the monotonous hues of the barren desert.

Deployment from Germany to Saudi Arabia was a monumental new challenge for VII Corps. The move to air and sea ports from Germany alone involved 465 trains, 312 barges and 119 convoys. All told, the Jayhawk Corps needed 578 aircraft and 140 ships to complete the strategic move. In addition to more than 100,000 active Army soldiers, VII Corps also eventually commanded 21,000 Army National Guard and Reserve personnel, and 24,000 British soldiers.

By mid-January tens of thousands of soldiers had married up with their equipment. The next step saw tanks, artillery and other "tracks" loaded on heavy equipment transports, with soldiers and baggage following in buses for the 300-plus mile convoy to VII Corps desert assembly areas. The long trip along Tapline Road introduced troops to the desert.

The deployment gave soldiers the chance to put long years of training to use and pick up new skills, too. Two brigades of tankers of the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kan. turned in their 105mm-equipped Abrams M1 tanks for the 120mm-gunned M1A1 version. American soldiers put new German-built "Fox" chemical-reconnaissance vehicles through their paces. Hundreds of drivers turned in used tactical vehicles for brand-new "Humvees" more capable of handling the harsh desert conditions.

Soldiers sharpened their weapons skills at firing ranges throughout the desert. Other soldiers straight from the AIT gunnery ranges of Fort Sill fired more practice rounds in the weeks before battle than they would in a year of training at Grafenwoehr.

Aviators, guarding their helicopters from the harsh climate, nonetheless flew combat formations flying and firing everything from rockets to Hellfire missiles. Infantrymen, more accustomed to firing their weapons than most, found endless chances to fire, use demo and tear up targets with their Bradleys' 25mm chain guns.

Planning for the future

But, while the soldiers welcomed the new equipment and live-fire exercises, they had yet to come to grips with the human side of going to war. Many NCOs and officers had combat experience in Vietnam, Grenada or Panama. They used their experience gained under fire to come up with training that allowed their charges the best chance to make it through the imminent war with the fewest casualties.

Boat

The Jan. 17 start of the air war sent a signal to the world in general, and Saddam Hussein in particular, that the United States and her coalition partners meant business. It also told soldiers that their time for battle was that much nearer. While the world hoped the massive air campaign would bring Hussein to his senses and he would pull out from Kuwait, corps soldiers continued to train and assemble combat power.

SCUD attacks begin

As Iraq responded to its loss of control of its airspace with SCUD missile attacks on civilians, soldiers donned chemical protective clothing and filled sandbags

Apache in flight

to build bunkers. They waited and continued to train in their assembly areas while their leaders refined the final tactics for the battle plan.

As the air war continued, leaders and planners fine-tuned the scheme of maneuver and prepared their units for the upcoming battle. Following their strategic bombing of command centers and manufacturing facilities, coalition air forces concentrated on Iraqi troop positions and armor concentrations which further weakened the enemy's resolve. This saved countless lives when the ground war began.

In early February, the corps' deployment had nearly ended. In addition to welcoming the continuing flow of soldiers new to Saudi Arabia, the corps secretly took the British 1st Armoured Division and the 1st Cavalry Division under its tactical umbrella. The British pulled out of the sector they held in eastern Saudi Arabia and headed west. The 1st Cav. continued the defense of the Wadi Al Batin area north of the city of Hafar Al Batin, a mission they had since January. This began what would become known as the battle of Rugi Pocket.

The VII Corps battle plan was to envelop the more formidable Iraqi defenses in western Kuwait by crossing into southern Iraq far west of the Wadi Al Batin. Critical to the plan was making Iraqi forces believe the corps would attack through the wadi. The 1st Cavalry

Division and Corps Artillery units had the job of making this deception credible. To ensure the deception worked, VII Corps waited until only days before the beginning of the ground offensive before rapidly shifting its divisions yet another 60 to 160 kilometers farther west to forward assembly areas. During the move they used the same battle formations they would use during the actual attack. Slowly, under the cover of the 1st Cav., the corps' positioning for the battle began to take shape.

Cross-border raids

In the middle of February, the 1st Cav. began a series of cross-border raids, and air and artillery attacks near the point where Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia meet. These attacks accomplished three main objectives.

First, artillery soldiers gained valuable experience firing under combat conditions. The VII Corps Artillery was able to spread the combat experience to many soldiers by rotating units through the area.

Second, since the attacks gave the Iraqis the impression that a ground attack would center on the Wadi al Batin, they entrenched a number of their infantry and armor divisions on the border of Iraq and Kuwait.

Finally, corps intelligence experts had a chance to develop their own picture of Iraqi intentions and morale. This built a sense of confidence in the chances for a

swift success. The valuable lessons learned from these attacks were shared throughout the corps.

After the corps moved to forward assembly areas, the 1st Infantry Division began its own series of probes and artillery raids west of the 1st Cav. area.

On Feb. 15, Baghdad Radio announced Iraq was willing to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait--provided the coalition granted certain conditions. This "cruel hoax," as President Bush called it, touched off a round of talks between Iraqi, Soviet and United Nations leadership; talks which most Americans realized held no promise for a peaceful end to the Gulf crisis. Most VII Corps soldiers knew their turn was coming.

Then on Feb. 23 the United States issued Hussein an ultimatum--begin to withdraw from Kuwait within 24 hours or face a ground attack. As the deadline ticked away, VII Corps soldiers headed for the border, poised to finally attack. Saddam Hussein's "Mother of All Battles" moved towards the stage.

Setting the stage


By now, the corps was in position, ready for action. The 1st Cav. began conducting a series of artillery raids and feints on the right, pinning down four Iraqi divisions. The 1st ID, in the center, moved toward its first-day objective--clearing a path to the main Iraqi defenses 10 miles north of the eight-foot dirt berm marking the Saudi Arabia-Iraq border. On the left, the 2nd ACR, which already had swept 30 kilometers north the day before, prepared to strike north and east, searching for enemy forces.

The attack met an Iraqi force deployed in depth. The enemy had infantry units in the front, backed up by two levels of armored reserves. The Iraqi 7th Corps faced VII Corps' eastern sector with four infantry divisions on line backed by a single armored division. Two more infantry divisions had dug in further west.

Next in depth came the Jihad Corps, made up of two more regular armored divisions. Further north the Republican Guard waited in reserve. The main thrust of the VII Corps offensive aimed at destroying these supposedly elite formations, the best in the Iraqi army.

Surprised enemy

The Iraqis were not capable of meeting a modern army able to maneuver rapidly and attack them in depth. Many Iraqis threw down their arms as soon as there was ground combat, but others stayed and fought. The intense air and artillery bombardment left Iraqi communications



in shambles, and air strikes made it difficult for Iraqi reserves to reach the battle. By the start of the Feb. 24 ground offensive, most Iraqi line infantry divisions had seen severe attrition. Their mechanized and armored formations proved stronger.

Day 1

The first day's action began as a limited attack to fix enemy forces and find their weaknesses. It turned into a day full of surprises--most of them good.

The 1st Cav. spent the first day on the extreme right flank continuing its series of raids. The moves kept Iraqi forces pinned near the border, unable to reinforce the hard-hit units to the west.

The Big Red One rolled through the berm toward the 26th Infantry Division. Before the war, the 1st ID had plows installed on the front of its Abrams tanks to clear paths through enemy minefields. Expecting slow going into the teeth of a fierce defense, the division found the enemy hadn't placed any mines forward of its main defense line.

Further west, the 2nd ACR found


nothing but daylight, sweeping through the desert from their flank position.

The battle reports were so favorable, at 1 p.m. the VII Corps commander agreed to speed up the timetable and launch the attack with only two-hours notice. Corps issued the order and the 1st and 3rd ADs followed 2nd ACR into Iraq at 3 p.m. The cavalry, meanwhile

drove even deeper behind Iraqi lines.

As events unfolded, it became apparent the corps had succeeded in its grand deception. The first day's attack met a demoralized enemy. The 1st Cavalry Division had four enemy divisions pinned in place near the Iraq-Kuwait border. Further west, the 1st ID drove its attack through Iraqi infantry defenses while

Tank going through berm



2nd ACR had light contact and increasing numbers of POWs. Saddam Hussein had fallen into a trap from which he never recovered.

Feb. 25 dawned on a corps in motion. First ID continued to clear the enemy to its front. The 1st (UK) AD moved up, ready to pass through and attack the Iraqi's reserves to the east. As the day wore on, the 1st ID destroyed the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division's frontline brigades. Turning east, it struck into the flank of the Iraqi 48th Infantry Division. They expanded the breach as planned, then passed the 1st (UK) AD who turned east at noon to attack the 52nd Armored Division.

In the west, the 2nd ACR continued moving, shifting east to allow the 1st AD to pass to the west. Around noon, the cavalry came into contact with parts of the 12th Armored Division. Shortly afterwards, the 1st AD, operating on the far left, and the 3rd AD, now placed between the cavalry and its sister armored division, struck dug-in infantry from the 26th Infantry Division. Both divisions rolled over the opposition quickly and moved on.

Later that day, the 1st AD engaged, using tactical air support and Apache attack helicopters, a reinforced infantry

Bradley

2nd ACR fight NO

brigade dug in around an Iraqi logistics center near the small town of Al Busayyah. The 1st AD continued attacks during the night with artillery and then attacked and destroyed the enemy log center early the next day.

The 3rd AD and 2nd ACR continued to push a running battle with isolated Iraqi units as they headed east into the night. Rain and sandstorms rolled in late in the day and through the night. That evening the corps shifted the attack east, deviating from the originally planned northeast attack, in anticipation of a massed three-division attack against the Republican Guard.

24th / Day 3

3rd AD

As the offensive intensified, so did the weather. Stiff breezes on the 25th turned into a raging sandstorm as dawn tried to break over the desert.

On the right, the British continued their relentless attack east. Reinforced by VII Corps Artillery units, the 1st (UK) smashed the enemy to its front as it moved east into the flank and behind the Iraqi Infantry divisions along the border. Meanwhile corps ordered the 1st Infantry Division to leave a battalion task force in the breach and move the division to the northeast to join 1st and 3rd ADs in

Formation through desert

the three-division attack.

The 2nd ACR continued to put units from the 12th Armored Division out of action throughout the morning while it found and fixed the Tawalkana Division along its southern flank. The Spearhead Division, passing north of the cavalry, drove east attacking the Tawalkana.

The next few hours developed into a mix of meeting engagements and fierce battles. "Cav" troopers found themselves facing mounting odds. They smashed into the Republican Guards repositioning and digging in across their front and began the Battle of the 73 Easting. Their thermal imaging systems gave them an edge over the Iraqi gunners they faced in the murky weather.


Around 6:20 p.m., the 3rd AD's cavalry squadron literally ran into the Tawalkana

Guards. Opening fire at ranges less than 600 meters, the cav troopers blasted away at Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery, calling for artillery fire and alerting the corps that the decisive battle it sought had begun. Combat operations continued unceasingly for the next 38 hours.

At 9:45 p.m., 11th Aviation Brigade Apache helicopters joined the battle launching the first of two night-time deep attacks against enemy forces moving west to join the fight. The 1st ID made a night passage of lines with the 2nd ACR and attacked between the British, still fighting in the south, and the 3rd AD, now heavily engaged against the Republican Guard. On the corps' northern boundary, the 1st Armored Division rushed forward to join the four-

TAW?

DAVID ?



Brad passing POWs

division night attack forming against the Republican Guard. Meanwhile corps ordered the 1st Cavalry Division released from theater reserve in mid-morning, moving them through the breach more than 250 kilometers to take up positions near 1st AD and prepare to attack east.

27th — Day 4 —

By dawn Feb. 27, the corps attack gained momentum and was well on its way to completing the systematic destruction of many of Iraq's armored formations. From the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border in the south to the northern edge of the corps sector 150 kilometers away, the four-division assault carried eastward throughout the day. As one Iraqi POW

later put it, "I stood and looked to the west and as far as I could see were tanks and more tanks--tanks everywhere."

On the right flank, the British finished off the enemy 52nd Armored Division. It then closed the trap on three remaining infantry divisions still huddling in their positions which faced the wrong way. It then began an attack east toward Highway 8, just north of Kuwait City.

The 1st ID, next in line, overran two brigades from the Iraqi 12th Armored Division. Division elements pushed on, also aiming for the main highway running north and south from Kuwait City to the southern Iraqi city of Basrah. The Iraqi 10th Armored division melted away east of the 12th Armored position, abandoning

their equipment and destroying their bunkers. Later in the day, elements of the Big Red One cut the Basrah-Kuwait City highway and began attacking north.

The 3rd AD, arrayed against the rapidly crumbling Tawalkana Division, crushed all opposition. Two attack helicopter battalions lent their firepower to the battle, the division's own and one from the 11th Aviation Brigade.

Meanwhile, 1st AD soldiers rushed eastward and, fresh from their battle at Al Busayyah, attacked through the right-flank brigade of the Tawalkana division and a brigade from the Republican Guard's Adnan Infantry Division northeast of the 3rd AD battle. When the division encountered a brigade from the Madinah Armored Division (yet another Republican Guard formation), it destroyed them in a series of sharp actions.


The remaining Republican guard forces, VII Corps' prime target, streamed northward in full retreat in the face of a double envelopment VII Corps had begun earlier with 1st Cavalry in the north and 1st ID as the southern arm.

Tank artwork

12 x 7.8 cm

28 / Day 5 / 6 + 4

The corps pushed on, with the 1st Cavalry Division now following the 1st AD in the north and the 2nd ACR backing the 1st ID in the center. The corps was within hours of closing the pincers of its double envelopment as the cease fire neared. Corps forces destroyed Iraqi bunkers, dug out the last stubborn defenders and began herding masses of




POWs toward the rear. The corps continued to attack east and northeast until the cease fire at 8 a.m.


The aftermath

The VII Corps attack overcame tough logistics challenges while covering more than 150 miles. In little more than 90 hours, corps soldiers smashed their Iraqi foe. During the fight and afterward the corps captured or destroyed 1,981 tanks, 1,938 armored personnel carriers, 713 artillery pieces and 658 air defense systems. In doing so, the corps bagged more than 22,000 prisoners. Most important, the corps achieved what it set out to do 112 days earlier, liberate Kuwait.

Interrogations of Iraqi prisoners of war demonstrated the respect VII Corps earned from its foe. One Iraqi general commented that "You attacked us with the same NATO force that was designed to attack the Warsaw Pact...and the entire earth shook."

While the intensive air war softened the Iraqi defenses, the ground war brought Saddam Hussein's reign of terror in Kuwait to an end. Throughout the country Kuwaitis rushed to greet and thank their liberators. The Jayhawk Corps had completed its immediate mission, and settled in to wait for a formal cease fire to begin.






in shambles, and air strikes made it difficult for Iraqi reserves to reach the battle. By the start of the Feb. 24 ground offensive, most Iraqi line infantry divisions had

nothing but daylight, sweeping through the desert from their flank position.

The battle reports were so favorable, at 1 p.m. the VII Corps commander

drove even deeper behind Iraqi lines.

As events unfolded, it became apparent the corps had succeeded in its grand deception. The first day's attack met a



2nd ACR had light contact and increasing numbers of POWs. Saddam Hussein had fallen into a trap from which he never recovered.

Feb. 25 dawned on a corps in motion. First ID continued to clear the enemy to its front. The 1st (UK) AD moved up, ready to pass through and attack the


smashed the enemy to its front as it moved east into the flank and behind the Iraqi Infantry divisions along the border. Meanwhile corps ordered the 1st Infantry Division to leave a battalion task force in the breach and move the division to the northeast to join 1st and 3rd ADs in


and digging in across their front and began the Battle of the 73 Easting. Their thermal imaging systems gave them an edge over the Iraqi gunners they faced in the murky weather.

Around 6:20 p.m., the 3rd AD's cavalry squadron literally ran into the Tawalkana

a night passage of lines with the 2nd ACR and attacked between the British, still fighting in the south, and the 3rd AD, now heavily engaged against the Republican Guard. On the corps' northern boundary, the 1st Armored Division rushed forward to join the four-

?





POWs toward the rear. The corps continued to attack east and northeast until the cease fire at 8 a.m.

The aftermath

The VII Corps attack overcame tough logistics challenges while covering more than 150 miles. In little more than 90 hours, corps soldiers smashed their Iraqi foe. During the fight and afterward the corps captured or destroyed 1,981 tanks, 1,938 armored personnel carriers, 713 artillery pieces and 658 air defense systems. In doing so, the corps bagged more than 22,000 prisoners. Most important, the corps achieved what it set out to do 112 days earlier, liberate Kuwait.

Interrogations of Iraqi prisoners of war demonstrated the respect VII Corps earned from its foe. One Iraqi general commented that "You attacked us with the same NATO force that was designed to attack the Warsaw Pact...and the entire earth shook."

While the intensive air war softened the Iraqi defenses, the ground war brought Saddam Hussein's reign of terror in Kuwait to an end. Throughout the country Kuwaitis rushed to greet and thank their liberators. The Jayhawk Corps had completed its immediate mission, and settled in to wait for a formal cease fire to begin.

